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Abstract. We analyze the household savings problem in a general setting where
returns on assets, non-financial income and impatience are all state dependent and
fluctuate over time. All three processes can be serially correlated and mutually
dependent. Rewards can be bounded or unbounded and wealth can be arbitrarily
large. Extending classic results from an earlier literature, we determine conditions
under which (a) solutions exist, are unique and are globally computable, and (b) the
resulting wealth dynamics are stationary, ergodic and geometric mixing. We show
how these results can be used to extend recent studies of the wealth distribution.
Our conditions have natural economic interpretations in terms of asymptotic growth
rates for discounting and return on savings.
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1. Introduction
It has been observed that, in the US and several other large economies, the wealth
distribution is heavy tailed and wealth inequality has risen sharply over the last few
decades.2 This matters not only for its direct impact on taxation and redistribution
1This paper has benefitted from discussion with many colleagues. We particularly thank Fedor
Iskhakov, Larry Liu and Chung Tran for valuable feedback and suggestions. The second author
gratefully acknowledges financial support from ARC grant FT160100423.
Email addresses: qingyin.ma@anu.edu.au, john.stachurski@anu.edu.au, atoda@ucsd.edu.
2For example, in a study based on capital income data, Saez and Zucman (2016) find that, in the
case of the US, the share of total household wealth held by the top 0.1% increased from 7 percent
to 22 percent between 1978 and 2012. For a discussion of the heavy-tailed property of the wealth
distribution, see Pareto (1896), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Benhabib and Bisin (2018), Vermeulen
(2018) or references therein.
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2policies, but also for potential flow-on effects for productivity growth, business cycles
and fiscal policy, as well as for the political environment that shapes these and other
economic outcomes.3
At present, our understanding of these phenomena is hampered by the fact that stan-
dard tools of analysis—such as those used for heterogeneous agent models—are not
well adapted to studying the wealth distribution as it stands. For example, while
we have sound understanding of the household problem when returns on savings and
rates of time discount are constant (see, e.g., Schechtman (1976), Schechtman and
Escudero (1977), Deaton and Laroque (1992), Carroll (1997), or Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018)),
our knowledge is far more limited in settings where these values are stochastic. This
is problematic, since injecting such features into the household problem is essential
for accurately representing the joint distribution of income and wealth (e.g., Ben-
habib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015), Benhabib, Bisin, and Luo (2017), Stachurski and Toda
(2019)).4 Moreover, models with time-varying discount rates and returns on assets
are at the forefront of recent quantitative analysis of wealth and inequality.5
While it might be hoped that the analysis of the income fluctuation problem (or
household consumption and savings problem) changes little when we shift from con-
stant to state dependent asset returns and rates of time discount, this turns out not
to be the case. Effectively modeling these features and the way they map to the
wealth distribution requires significant advances in our understanding of choice and
stochastic dynamics in the setting of optimal savings.
3One analysis of the two-way interactions between inequality and political decision making can
be found in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002). Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) show how in-
equality can alter economic and social outcomes through subversion of institutions. The same study
contains references on linkages between inequality and growth. Regarding fiscal policy, Brinca,
Holter, Krusell, and Malafry (2016) find strong correlations between wealth inequality and the mag-
nitude of fiscal multipliers, while Bhandari, Evans, Golosov, and Sargent (2018) study the connection
between fiscal-monetary policy, business cycles and inequality. Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and
Wolf (2018) discuss the impact of distributional properties on macroeconomic aggregates.
4Also related is the recent experimental study of Epper, Fehr, Fehr-Duda, Kreiner, Lassen, Leth-
Petersen, and Rasmussen (2018), which finds a strong positive connection between dispersion in
subjective rates of time discounting across the population and realized dispersion in the wealth
distribution. This in turn is consistent with earlier empirical studies such as Lawrance (1991).
5For a recent quantitative study see, for example, Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2018), where
returns on savings and discount rates are both state dependent (as is labor income). Kaymak,
Leung, and Poschke (2018) find that asset return heterogeneity is required to match the upper tail
of the wealth distribution.
3One difficulty is that state-dependent discounting takes us beyond the bounds of dy-
namic programming theory. This matters little if there exists some constant β¯ < 1
such that the discount process {βt} satisfies βt ≤ β¯ for all t with probability one,
since, in this case, a standard contraction mapping argument can still be applied
(see, e.g., Miao (2006) or Cao (2018)). However, recent quantitative studies extend
beyond such settings. For example, AR(1) specifications are increasingly common, in
which case the support of βt is unbounded above at every point in time.
6 Even if dis-
cretization is employed, the outcome βt ≥ 1 can occur with positive probability when
the approximation is sufficiently fine. Moreover, such outcomes are not inconsistent
with empirical and experimental evidence, at least for some households in some states
of the world.7 Do there exist conditions on {βt} that allow for βt ≥ 1 in some states
and yet imply existence of optimal polices and practical computational techniques?
Another source of complexity for the income fluctuation problem in the general set-
ting considered here is that the set of possible values for household assets is typically
unbounded above. For example, when returns on assets are stochastic, a sufficiently
long sequence of favorable returns can compound one another to project a house-
hold to arbitrarily high levels of wealth. This model feature is desirable: We wish
to analyze these kinds of outcomes rather than rule them out. Indeed, Benhabib,
Bisin, and Zhu (2015) and other related studies argue convincingly that such out-
comes are a key causal mechanism behind the heavy tail of the current distribution
of wealth.8 However, if we accept this logic, then stationarity and ergodicity of the
wealth process—which are fundamental both for estimation and for simulation-based
numerical methods—must now be established in a setting where the wealth distribu-
tion has unbounded support. In such a scenario, what conditions on preferences and
financial and labor income are necessary for these properties to hold?
6See, for example, Hills and Nakata (2018), Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2018) or Schorfheide,
Song, and Yaron (2018).
7See, for example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991).
8One related study is Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011), who show that capital income risk is the
driving force of the heavy-tail properties of the stationary wealth distribution. In Blanchard-Yaari
style economies, Toda (2014), Toda and Walsh (2015) and Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2016) show
that idiosyncratic investment risk generates a double Pareto stationary wealth distribution. Gabaix,
Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016) point out that a positive correlation of returns with wealth (“scale
dependence”) in addition to persistent heterogeneity in returns (“type dependence”) can well explain
the speed of changes in the tail inequality observed in the data.
4A final and related example of the need for deeper analysis is that, if we wish to
understand the upper tail of the wealth distribution, we should avoid unnecessarily
truncating the upper tail of the set of possible asset values. While truncation is
convenient because finite or compact state spaces are easier to handle computationally,
we can attain greater accuracy in modeling the wealth distribution if truncation at the
upper tail can be replaced locally by a parameterized savings function, such as a linear
function (Gouin-Bonenfant and Toda, 2018). However, any such approximation must
be justified by theory. What conditions can be imposed on primitives to generate
such properties while still maintaining realistic assumptions for asset returns and
non-financial income?
In this paper we address all of these questions, along with other key properties of
the income fluctuation problem, such as continuity and monotonicity of the optimal
consumption policy. Our setting admits capital income risk, labor earnings shocks
and time-varying discount rates, driven by a combination of iid innovations and an
exogenous Markov chain {Zt}. The supports of the innovations can be unbounded, so
we admit practical innovation sequences such as normal and lognormal. As a whole,
this environment allows for a range of realistic features, such as stochastic volatility
in returns on asset holdings, or correlation in the shocks impacting asset returns and
non-financial income. The utility function can be unbounded both above and below,
with no specific structure imposed beyond differentiability, concavity and the usual
slope (Inada) conditions.9
To begin, when considering optimality in the household problem, we require a con-
dition on the state dependent discount process {βt} that generalizes the classical
condition β < 1 from the constant case and, for reasons discussed above, permits
βt > 1 with positive probability. To this end, we introduce the restriction
10
Gβ < 1 where Gβ := lim
n→∞
(
E
n∏
t=1
βt
)1/n
. (1)
9While the assumption that the exogenous state process {Zt} is a (finite state) Markov chain
might appear restrictive, it fits most practical settings and avoids a host of technical issues that
tend to obscure the key ideas. We treat the case of general state space in a separate paper, showing
that, once these technical issues are taken care of, the same core ideas still apply. Moreover, the
innovation shocks are not restricted to be discrete, and the same is true of course for assets and
consumption.
10Here and below we set β0 ≡ 1, so
∏n
t=1 βt =
∏n
t=0 βt.
5Condition (1) clearly generalizes the classical condition β < 1 for the constant dis-
count case. In the stochastic case, lnGβ can be understood as the asymptotic growth
rate of the probability weighted average discount factor. Indeed, if Bt := E
∏n
t=1 βt
is the average t-period discount factor, then, from the definition of Gβ and some
straightforward analysis, we obtain ln(Bt+1/Bt) → lnGβ, so the condition Gβ < 1
implies that the asymptotic growth rate of the average t-period discount factor is
negative, drifting down from its initial condition β0 ≡ 1 at the rate lnGβ. This does
not, of course, preclude the possibility that βt > 1 at any given t.
We show that condition (1) is in fact a necessary condition in those settings where
the classical condition is necessary for finite lifetime values. In this sense it cannot
be further weakened for the income fluctuation problem apart from special cases. At
the same time, it admits the use of convenient specifications such as the discretized
AR(1) process from Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2018). We also prove that Gβ can
be represented as the spectral radius of a positive matrix, and hence can be computed
by numerical linear algebra (as discussed below).
We also generalize the standard condition βR < 1, where R is the gross interest rate
in the constant case, which is used to ensure stability of the asset path and finiteness
of lifetime valuations, as well as existence of stationary Markov policies (see, e.g.,
Deaton and Laroque (1992), Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) or Li and Stachurski
(2014)). Analogous to (1), we introduce the generalized condition
GβR < 1 where GβR := lim
n→∞
(
E
n∏
t=1
βtRt
)1/n
. (2)
Here {Rt} is a stochastic capital income process. Analogous to the case of Gβ, the
value lnGβR can be understood as the asymptotic growth rate of average gross payoff
on assets, discounted to present value.
We show that, when Conditions (1)–(2) hold and non-financial income satisfies two
moment conditions, then a unique optimal consumption policy exists. We also show
that the policy can be computed by successive approximations and analyze its prop-
erties, such as monotonicity and asymptotic linearity. This asymptotic linearity can
be used to successfully model wealth inequality by accurately representing asset path
dynamics for very high wealth households (Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu, 2015; Gouin-
Bonenfant and Toda, 2018).
One important feature of Conditions (1)–(2) is that they take into account the au-
tocorrelation structure of preference shocks and asset returns. For example, if these
6processes depend only on iid innovations, then (1) reduces to Eβt < 1 and (2) reduces
to EβtRt < 1. But returns on assets are typically not iid, since both mean returns
and volatility are, in general, time varying, and preference shocks are typically mod-
eled as correlated (see, e.g., Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2018) or Schorfheide, Song,
and Yaron (2018)). This dependence must be and is accounted for in (2), since long
upswings in {βt} and {Rt} can lead to explosive paths for valuations and assets.
Next we study asymptotic stability, stationarity and ergodicity of wealth. Such prop-
erties are essential to existence of stationary equilibria in heterogeneous agent models
(e.g., Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994) or Cao (2018)), as well as standard estimation,
calibration and simulation techniques that connect time series averages with cross-
sectional moments.11 These properties require an additional restriction, placed on the
asymptotic growth rate of mean returns. Analogous to (1) and (2), this is defined as
GR := lim
n→∞
(
E
n∏
t=1
Rt
)1/n
. (3)
We show that if GR is sufficiently restricted and a degree of social mobility is present,
then there exists a unique stationary distribution for the state process, the distri-
butional path of the state process under the optimal path converges globally to the
stationary distribution, and the stationary distribution is ergodic. We also show that,
under some mild additional conditions, the rate of convergence of marginal distribu-
tions to the stationary distribution is geometric, and that a version of the Central
Limit Theorem is valid. The latter provides a rate of convergence for time series
averages and asymptotic distributions for standard estimators.
Our study is related to Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015), who prove the existence of a
heavy-tailed wealth distribution in an infinite horizon heterogeneous agent economy
with capital income risk. In the process, they show that households facing a stochastic
return on savings possess a unique optimal consumption policy characterized by the
(boundary constraint-contingent) Euler equation, and that a unique and unbounded
stationary distribution exists for wealth under this consumption policy. They assume
isoelastic utility, constant discounting, and mutually independent, iid returns and
labor income processes, both supported on bounded closed intervals with strictly
positive lower bounds. We relax all of these assumptions. Apart from allowing more
general utility and state dependent discounting, this permits such realistic features for
11A well-known example of a computational technique that uses ergodicity can be found in Krusell
and Smith (1998). On the estimation side see, for example, Hansen and West (2002).
7household income as positive correlations between labor earnings and wealth returns
(an extension that was suggested by Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015)), or time varying
volatility in returns.12
Another related paper is Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), which studies an income
fluctuation problem with stochastic income and asset returns and obtains many signif-
icant results on asymptotic properties of consumption. Their study imposes relatively
few restrictions on the wealth return and labor income processes. Our paper extends
their work by allowing for random discounting, as well as dropping their boundedness
restriction on the utility, which prevents their work from being used in many standard
settings such as constant relative risk aversion. We also develop a set of new results
on stability and ergodicity, as well as asymptotic normality of the wealth process.
Our optimality theory draws on techniques found in Li and Stachurski (2014), who
show that the time iteration operator is a contraction mapping with respect to a met-
ric that evaluates consumption differences in terms of marginal utility, while assuming
a constant discount factor and constant rate of return on assets.13 We show that these
ideas extend to a setting where both returns and discount rates are stochastic and
time varying. Our results on dynamics under the optimal policy have no counterparts
in Li and Stachurski (2014).
In a similar vein, our work is related to several other papers that treat the standard
income fluctuation problems with constant rates of return on assets and constant
discount rates, such as Rabault (2002), Carroll (2004) and Kuhn (2013). While
Carroll (2004) constructs a weighted supremum norm contraction and works with the
Bellman operator, the other two papers focus on time iteration. In particular, Rabault
(2002) exploits the monotonicity structure, while Kuhn (2013) applies a version of
the Tarski fixed point theorem. Our techniques for studying optimality are close to
those in Li and Stachurski (2014), as discussed above.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem and
establishes optimality results. Sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of optimal policies are discussed. Section 3 focuses on stochastic stability. Section 4
discusses our key conditions and how they can be checked. Section 5 provides a set of
12Empirical motivation for these kinds of extensions can be found in numerous studies, including
Guvenen and Smith (2014) and Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri (2016a,b).
13Coleman (1990) introduced the time iteration operator as a constructive method for solving
stochastic growth models. It has since been used in Datta, Mirman, and Reffett (2002), Morand
and Reffett (2003) and many other studies.
8applications and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are deferred to the appendix. Code
that generates our figures can be found at https://github.com/jstac/ifp_public.
2. The Income Fluctuation Problem and Optimality Results
This section formulates the income fluctuation problem we consider, establishes the
existence, uniqueness and computability of a solution, and derives its properties.
2.1. Problem Statement. We consider a general income fluctuation problem, where
a household chooses a consumption-asset path {(ct, at)} to solve
max E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
i=0
βi
)
u(ct)
}
s.t. at+1 = Rt+1(at − ct) + Yt+1, (4)
0 ≤ ct ≤ at, (a0, Z0) = (a, z) given,
where u is the utility function, {βt}t≥0 is discount factor process with β0 = 1, {Rt}t≥1
is the gross rate of return on wealth, and {Yt}t≥1 is non-financial income. These
stochastic processes obey
βt = β (Zt, εt) , Rt = R (Zt, ζt) , and Yt = Y (Zt, ηt) , (5)
where β, R and Y are measurable nonnegative functions and {Zt}t≥0 is an irreducible
time-homogeneous Z-valued Markov chain taking values in finite set Z. Let P (z, zˆ)
be the probability of transitioning from z to zˆ in one step. The innovation processes
{εt}, {ζt} and {ηt} are iid independent and their supports can be continuous and
vector-valued.
The function u maps R+ to {−∞} ∪ R, is twice differentiable on (0,∞), satisfies
u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 everywhere on (0,∞), and that u′(c)→∞ as c→ 0 and u′(c) < 1
as c→∞. We define
Ea,z := E
[ · ∣∣ (a0, Z0) = (a, z)] and Ez := E [ · ∣∣Z0 = z] . (6)
The next period value of a random variable X is typically denoted Xˆ. Expectation
without a subscript refers to the stationary process, where Z0 is drawn from its
(necessarily unique) stationary distribution.
Example 2.1. The optimization problem stated above includes the problem faced by
households in Cao (2018), which in turn builds on Krusell and Smith (1998). In that
model, randomness in the discount factor process is driven by idiosyncratic preference
9shocks {it}, while returns on assets fluctuate due to an aggregate shock process {st}
impacting productivity. Non-financial income is affected by both the idiosyncratic
shocks and the aggregate shocks. His scenario fits our framework when Zt = (st, it).
The innovation vectors in (5) are not required.
2.2. Key Conditions. Our conditions for optimality are listed below. In what fol-
lows, Gβ is the asymptotic growth rate of the discount process as defined in (1).
Assumption 2.1. The discount factor process satisfies Gβ < 1.
Assumption 2.1 is a natural extension of the standard condition β < 1 from the
constant discount case. If βt ≡ β for all t, then Gβ = β, as follows immediately
from the definition. It is weaker than the obvious sufficient condition βt ≤ β¯ with
probability one for some constant β¯ < 1, since in such a setting we have Gβ ≤ β¯ < 1.
In fact it cannot be significantly weakened, as the theorem shows.
Theorem 2.1 (Necessity of the discount condition). Let βt and u(Yt) be positive
with probability one for all t and all initial states z in Z. If, in this setting, we have
Gβ ≥ 1, then the objective in (4) is infinite at every initial state (a, z).
The positivity assumed here may or may not hold in applications, but Theorem 2.1
shows that special conditions will have to be imposed on preferences if Assumption 2.1
fails. Put differently, allowing Gβ ≥ 1 is tantamount to allowing β ≥ 1 in the case
when the discount rate is constant.
Next, we need to ensure that the present discounted value of wealth does not grow
too quickly, which requires a joint restriction on asset returns and discounting. When
{Rt} and {βt} are constant at values R and β, the standard restriction from the
existing literature is βR < 1. A generalization using GβR as defined in (2) is
Assumption 2.2. The discount factor and return processes satisfy GβR < 1.
Finally, we impose routine technical restrictions on non-financial income. The second
restriction is needed to exploit first order conditions.
Assumption 2.3. EY <∞ and Eu′(Y ) <∞.
Next we provide one example where Assumptions 2.1–2.3 are easily verified. More
complex examples are deferred to Sections 4 and 5.
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Example 2.2. Suppose, as in Benhabib et al. (2015), that there is a constant dis-
count factor β < 1, utility is CRRA with γ ≥ 1, {Rt} and {Yt} are iid, mutually
independent, supported on bounded closed intervals of strictly positive real numbers,
and, moreover,
βER1−γt < 1 and (βER
1−γ
t )
1/γ
ERt < 1. (7)
Assumptions 2.1–2.3 are all satisfied in this case. To see this, observe that Gβ = β
in the constant discount case, so Gβ < 1 is immediate. The inequalities in (7) imply
that βERt < 1, which in turn gives GβR < 1, since GβR = βERt in the iid setting of
Benhabib et al. (2015). Thus, Assumptions 2.1–2.2 hold. Assumption 2.3 also holds
because Yt is restricted to a compact subset of the positive reals.
2.3. Optimality: Definitions and Fundamental Properties. To consider opti-
mality, we temporarily assume that a0 > 0 and set the asset space to (0,∞).14 The
state space for the state process {(at, Zt)}t≥0 is then S0 := (0,∞)×Z. A feasible policy
is a Borel measurable function c : S0 → R with 0 ≤ c(a, z) ≤ a for all (a, z) ∈ S0. A
feasible policy c and initial condition (a, z) ∈ S0 generate an asset path {at}t≥0 via
(4) when ct = c(at, Zt) and (a0, Z0) = (a, z). The lifetime value of policy c is
Vc(a, z) = Ea,z
∞∑
t=0
β0 · · · βtu [c(at, Zt)] , (8)
where {at} is the asset path generated by (c, (a, z)). In the Appendix we show that
Vc is well-defined on S0. A feasible policy c
∗ is called optimal if Vc ≤ Vc∗ on S0 for
any feasible policy c. A feasible policy is said to satisfy the first order optimality
condition if
(u′ ◦ c) (a, z) ≥ Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c)
(
Rˆ [a− c(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ
)
(9)
for all (a, z) ∈ S0, and equality holds when c(a, z) < a. Noting that u′ is decreasing,
the first order optimality condition can be compactly stated as
(u′ ◦ c) (a, z) = max
{
Ez βˆRˆ (u
′ ◦ c)
(
Rˆ [a− c(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ
)
, u′(a)
}
(10)
for all (a, z) ∈ S0. A feasible policy is said to satisfy the transversality condition if,
for all (a, z) ∈ S0,
lim
t→∞
Ea,z β0 · · · βt (u′ ◦ c) (at, Zt) at = 0. (11)
14Assumption 2.3 combined with u′(0) = ∞ implies that P{Yt > 0} = 1 for all t ≥ 1. Hence,
P{at > 0} = 1 for all t ≥ 1 and exclude zero from the asset space makes no difference to optimality.
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Theorem 2.2 (Sufficiency of first order and transversality conditions). If Assump-
tions 2.1–2.3 hold, then every feasible policy satisfying the first order and transver-
sality conditions is an optimal policy.
2.4. Existence and Computability of Optimal Consumption. Let C be the
space of continuous functions c : S0 → R such that c is increasing in the first argument,
0 < c(a, z) ≤ a for all (a, z) ∈ S0, and
sup
(a,z)∈S0
|(u′ ◦ c)(a, z)− u′(a)| <∞. (12)
To compare two consumption policies, we pair C with the distance
ρ(c, d) := ‖u′ ◦ c− u′ ◦ d‖ := sup
(a,z)∈S0
|(u′ ◦ c) (a, z)− (u′ ◦ d) (a, z)| , (13)
which evaluates the maximal difference in terms of marginal utility. While elements
of C are not generally bounded, ρ is a valid metric on C . In particular, ρ is finite
on C since ρ(c, d) ≤ ‖u′ ◦ c− u′‖+ ‖u′ ◦ d− u′‖, and the last two terms are finite by
(12). In Appendix B, we show that (C , ρ) is a complete metric space. The following
proposition shows that, for any policy in C , the first order optimality condition (10)
implies the transversality condition.
Proposition 2.1 (Sufficiency of first order condition). Let Assumptions 2.1–2.3 hold.
If c ∈ C and the first order optimality condition (10) holds for all (a, z) ∈ S0, then c
satisfies the transversality condition. In particular, c is an optimal policy.
Inspired by Proposition 2.1, we aim to characterize the optimal policy as the fixed
point of the time iteration operator T defined as follows: for fixed c ∈ C and (a, z) ∈
S0, the value of the image Tc at (a, z) is defined as the ξ ∈ (0, a] that solves
u′(ξ) = ψc(ξ, a, z), (14)
where ψc is the function on
G := {(ξ, a, z) ∈ R+ × (0,∞)× Z : 0 < ξ ≤ a} (15)
defined by
ψc(ξ, a, z) := max
{
Ez βˆRˆ(u
′ ◦ c)[Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ], u′(a)
}
. (16)
The following theorem shows that the time iteration operator is an n-step contraction
mapping on a complete metric space of candidate policies and its fixed point is the
unique optimal policy.
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Theorem 2.3 (Existence, uniqueness and computability of optimal policies). If As-
sumptions 2.1–2.3 hold, then there exists an n in N such that T n is a contraction
mapping on (C , ρ). In particular,
(1) T has a unique fixed point c∗ ∈ C .
(2) The fixed point c∗ is the unique optimal policy in C .
(3) For all c ∈ C we have ρ(T kc, c∗)→ 0 as k →∞.
Part (3) shows that, under our conditions, the familiar time iteration algorithm is
globally convergent, provided one starts with some policy in the candidate class C .
2.5. Properties of Optimal Consumption. In this section we study the properties
of the optimal consumption function obtained in Theorem 2.3. Assumptions 2.1–2.3
are held to be true throughout. The following two propositions show the monotonicity
of the consumption function, which is intuitive.
Proposition 2.2 (Monotonicity with respect to wealth). The optimal consumption
and savings functions c∗(a, z) and i∗(a, z) := a− c∗(a, z) are increasing in a.
Proposition 2.3 (Monotonicity with respect to income). If {Y1t} and {Y2t} are two
income processes satisfying Y1t ≤ Y2t for all t and c∗1 and c∗2 are the corresponding
optimal consumption functions, then c∗1 ≤ c∗2 pointwise on S0.
Under further assumptions we can show that the optimal policy is concave and asymp-
totically linear with respect to the wealth level.
Proposition 2.4 (Concavity and asymptotic linearity of consumption function). If
for each z ∈ Z and c ∈ C that is concave in its first argument,
x 7→ (u′)−1
[
βEzRˆ (u
′ ◦ c) (Rˆx+ Yˆ , zˆ)
]
is concave on R+, (17)
then
(1) a 7→ c∗(a, z) is concave, and
(2) there exists α(z) ∈ [0, 1] such that lima→∞[c∗(a, z)/a] = α(z).
Remark 2.1. Condition (17) imposes some concavity structure on utility. It holds
for the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
u(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ if γ > 0 and u(c) = log c if γ = 1, (18)
as shown in Appendix B.
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Proposition 2.4 states that c∗(a, z) ≈ α(z)a + b(z) for some function b(z) when a is
large. This provides justification for linearly extrapolating the policy functions when
computing them at high wealth levels.
Together, parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 2.4 imply the linear lower bound c∗(a, z) ≥
α(z)a, although they do not provide a concrete number for α(z). The following
proposition establishes an explicit linear lower bound.
Proposition 2.5 (Linear lower bound on consumption). If there exists a nonnegative
constant s¯ such that
s¯ < 1 and Ez βˆRˆ u
′(Rˆ s¯ a) ≤ u′(a) for all (a, z) ∈ S0, (19)
then c∗(a, z) ≥ (1− s¯)a for all (a, z) ∈ S0.15
The second inequality in (19) restricts marginal utility derived from transferring
wealth to the next period and then consuming versus consuming wealth today. The
value s¯ can be clarified once primitives are specified, as the next example illustrates.
Example 2.3. Suppose that utility is CRRA, as in (18). If we now take
s¯ :=
(
max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆ
1−γ
)1/γ
(20)
and s¯ < 1, then the conditions of Proposition 2.5 hold. In particular, the second
inequality in (19) holds, as follows directly from the definition of s¯ and u′(x) = x−γ.
In the case of Benhabib et al. (2015), where the discount rate is constant and returns
are iid, the expression in (20) reduces to s¯ := (βER1−γt )
1/γ. The requirement s¯ < 1
then reduces to βER1−γt < 1, which is one of their assumptions (see Example 2.2).
3. Stationarity and Ergodicity of Wealth
This section focuses on stationarity and ergodicity of wealth under the unique optimal
policy c∗ obtained in Theorem 2.3. So that this policy exists, Assumptions 2.1–2.3
are always taken to be valid. We extend c∗ to S by setting c∗(0, z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z
and consider dynamics of (at, Zt) on S := R+ × Z, the law of motion for which is
at+1 = R (Zt+1, ζt+1) [at − c∗ (at, Zt)] + Y (Zt+1, ηt+1) , (21a)
Zt+1 ∼ P (Zt, · ) (21b)
15We adopt the convention 0 · ∞ = 0, so condition (19) does not rule out the case P{Rt = 0 |
Zt−1 = z} > 0. Indeed, as shown in the proofs, the conclusions still hold if we replace this condition
by the weaker alternative EzβˆRˆ u
′[Rˆs¯a+ (1− s¯)Yˆ ] ≤ u′(a) for all (a, z) ∈ S0.
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Let Q be the joint stochastic kernel of (at, Zt) on S. See Appendix A for this and
other definitions of dynamic properties used below.
To obtain existence of a stationary distribution we need to restrict the asymptotic
growth rate for asset returns GR defined in (3).
Assumption 3.1. There exists a constant s¯ such that (19) holds and s¯ GR < 1.
Below is one straightforward example of a setting where this holds, with more complex
applications deferred to Sections 4–5.
Example 3.1. Assumption 3.1 holds in the setting of Benhabib et al. (2015). As
shown in Example 2.3, with s¯ := (βER1−γt )
1/γ and the assumptions of Benhabib
et al. (2015) in force, the conditions of (19) hold. Moreover, in their iid setting we
have GR = ERt, so s¯ GR < 1 reduces to (βER
1−γ
t )
1/γ
ERt < 1. This is one of their
conditions, as discussed in Example 2.2.
By Proposition 2.5, the value s¯ in Assumption 3.1 is an upper bound on the rate
of savings. GR is an asymptotic growth rate for each unit of savings invested. If
the product of these is less than one, then probability mass contained in the wealth
distribution will not drift to +∞, which allows us to obtain the following result.16
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of a stationary distribution). If Assumption 3.1 holds, then
Q admits at least one stationary distribution on S.
The stationarity in Theorem 3.1 is required to establish existence of recursive equilib-
ria in traditional heterogeneous agent models with idiosyncratic risk such as Huggett
(1993) or Aiyagari (1994), as well as for models with aggregate risk, such as Krusell
and Smith (1998). For a discussion of the latter case see Cao (2018).
While Assumption 3.1 implies existence of a stationary distribution, it is not in general
sufficient for uniqueness or asymptotic stability, as well as closely related sample path
properties such as ergodicity. For these additional properties to hold, we must impose
sufficient mixing. In doing so, we consider the following two cases:
16Assumption 3.1 is weaker than any restriction implying wealth is bounded from above—a com-
mon device for compactifying the state space and thereby obtaining a stationary distribution. In-
deed, under many specifications of {Yt} and {Rt} that fall within our framework, wealth of a given
household can and will, over an infinite horizon, exceed any finite bound with probability one. See,
for example, Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015), Proposition 6.
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(Y1) The support of {Yt} is finite.
(Y2) The process {Yt} admits a density representation.
Condition (Y2) means that there exists a function f from R+ × Z to R+ such that
P{Yt ∈ A | Zt = z} =
∫
A
f(y | z) dy (22)
for all Borel sets A ⊂ R+ and all z in Z.
Assumption 3.2. There exists a z¯ in Z such that P (z¯, z¯) > 0. Moreover, with y` ≥ 0
defined as the greatest lower bound of the support of {Yt}, either
• (Y1) holds and P{Yt = y` | Zt = z¯} > 0, or
• (Y2) holds and there exists a δ > y` such that f (· | z¯) > 0 on (y`, δ).
Assumption 3.2 requires that there is a positive probability of receiving low labor
income at some relatively persistent state of the world z¯. This is a mixing condition
that enforces social mobility. The reason is that {Zt} is already assumed to be
irreducible, so z¯ is eventually visited by each household. For any such household,
there is a positive probability of low labor income over a long period. Wealth then
declines. In other words, currently rich households or dynasties will not be rich
forever. This guarantees sufficient social mobility between rich and poor, generating
an ergodic wealth distribution.
To state our uniqueness and stability results, let Qt be the t-step stochastic kernel,
let ‖ · ‖TV be total variation norm and let V (a, z) := a + mV , where mV is a con-
stant to be defined in the proof. For any integrable real-valued function h on S, let
ST (h) :=
∑T
t=1 h(at, Zt) and h¯(a, z) := h(a, z) − Eh(at, Zt), where E indicates, as
usual, expectation under stationarity.
Theorem 3.2 (Uniqueness, stability, ergodicity and mixing). If Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2 hold, then
(1) the stationary distribution ψ∗ of Q is unique and there exist constants λ < 1
and M <∞ such that, for all (a, z) ∈ S,∥∥Qt ((a, z), ·)− ψ∗∥∥
TV
≤ λtMV (a, z).
(2) For all z in Z and real-valued functions h on S such that E|h(at, Zt)| <∞,
Pz
{
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
h(at, Zt) = Eh(at, Zt)
}
= 1.
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(3) Q is V -geometrically mixing and
1√
Tγ2h
ST (h¯)
d→ N(0, 1) as T →∞.
whenever γ2h := E
[
h¯2(a0, Z0)
]
+ 2
∑∞
t=1E
[
h¯(a0, Z0)h¯(at, Zt)
]
> 0 and h2/V
is bounded.
Part 1 of Theorem 3.2 states that the stationary distribution ψ∗ is unique and asymp-
totically attracting at a geometric rate. Part 2 states that the state process is er-
godic, and hence long-run sample moments for individual households coincide with
cross-sectional moments. The notion of mixing discussed in Part 3 is defined in the
appendix. It states that social mobility holds asymptotically and mixing occurs at a
geometric rate, although the rate may be arbitrarily slow. This mixing is enough to
provide a Central Limit Theorem for the state process, which is the second claim in
Part 3.
4. Testing the Growth Conditions
The three key conditions in the paper are the restrictions on the growth rates Gβ,
GβR and GR, with the first two required for optimality and the last need for station-
arity (see Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 respectively). In this section we explore the
restrictions implied by these conditions. We begin with the following result, which
yields a straightforward method for computing these growth rates.
Lemma 4.1 (Long-run growth rates and spectral radii). Let ϕt = ϕ(Zt, ξt), where
ϕ is a nonnegative measurable function and {ξt} is an iid sequence with marginal
distribution pi. In this setting we have
Gϕ = r(Lϕ), where Gϕ := lim
n→∞
(
E
n∏
t=1
ϕt
)1/n
(23)
and r(Lϕ) is the spectral radius of the matrix defined by
Lϕ(z, zˆ) = P (z, zˆ)
∫
ϕ(zˆ, ξˆ)pi(dξˆ). (24)
The matrix Lϕ is expressed as a function on Z× Z in (24) but can be represented in
traditional matrix notation by enumerating Z.17
17Specifically, if Z := {z1, . . . , zN}, then Lϕ = PDϕ where P is, as before, the transition matrix
for the exogenous state, and Dϕ := diag (Ez1ϕ, . . . ,EzNϕ) when Ezϕ := Ezϕ(z, ξˆ). In what follows,
Dβ , DR and DβR are defined analogously to Dϕ.
17
What factors determine the long-run average growth rates embedded in our assump-
tions, such as Gβ or GR? Lemma 4.1 tells us how to compute these values for a given
specification of dynamics, but how should we understand them intuitively and what
factors determine their size? To address these questions, let us consider an AR(1)
discount factor process, which has been adopted in several recent quantitative stud-
ies (see, e.g., Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2018) or Hills and Nakata (2018)). In
particular, suppose that the state process follows a discretized version of
Zt+1 = ρZt + (1− ρ)µ+ (1− ρ2)1/2συt+1, {υt} iid∼ N(0, 1), (25)
and βt = Zt. (The discretization implies that βt is always positive.) To simplify
interpretation, the process (25) is structured so that the stationary distribution of
{Zt} is N(µ, σ2). We use Rouwenhorst (1995)’s method to discretize {Zt} and then
calculate Gβ using Lemma 4.1, studying how Gβ is affected by the parameters in (25).
Since βt = Zt for all t, the structure of (25) implies that µ is the long-run unconditional
mean of {βt}. It can therefore be set to standard calibrated value for the discount
factor, such as 0.99 from Krusell and Smith (1998). What we wish to understand is
how the remaining parameters ρ and σ affect the value of Gβ. While no closed form
expression is available in this case, Figure 1 sheds some light by providing a contour
plot of Gβ over a set of (ρ, σ) pairs. The figure shows that Gβ grows with both the
persistence term ρ and volatility term σ. In particular, the condition Gβ < 1 fails
when the persistence and volatility of the discount factor process are sufficiently high.
This is because Gβ is the limit of (E
∏n
t=1 βt)
1/n
and, for positive random variables,
sequence of large outcomes have a strong compounding effect on their product. High
volatility and high persistence reinforce this effect.
This discussion has focused on Gβ but similar intuition applies to both GR and GβR.
If βt and Rt are both increasing functions of the state process, then these asymptotic
growth rates also increase with greater persistence and volatility in the state process,
as well as higher unconditional mean. The next section further illustrates these points.
5. Application: Stochastic Volatility and Mean Persistence
We showed in Examples 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 that, in the setting of Benhabib et al.
(2015), where the discount factor is constant and returns and labor income are iid,
Assumptions 2.1–2.3 and Assumption 3.1 are all satisfied. Hence, by Theorems 2.3
and 3.1, the household optimization problem has a unique optimal policy and the
wealth process under this policy has a stationary solution. If, in addition, the support
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Figure 1. Contour plot of Gβ under AR(1) discounting
of Yt is finite or Yt has a positive density, say, then the conditions of Theorem 3.2 also
hold and the stationary solution is ergodic, geometrically mixing and its time series
averages are asymptotically normal.
While some of the results just stated are new, we can obtain more important results
by relaxing the iid restrictions on financial and non-financial returns. For example, we
can allow for both mean persistence and time varying volatility in returns on assets,
the importance of which for wealth dynamics has been highlighted in Fagereng et al.
(2016a) and other recent studies. (We do not, however, intend to reproduce or extend
the important results on Pareto tails of the stationary wealth distribution obtained
by Benhabib et al. (2015), which are beyond the scope of this study.)
To illustrate, we continue in the setting of Benhabib et al. (2015) but now shift returns
on assets to
logRt = µt + σtζt, (26)
where {ζt} is iid and standard normal and {µt} and {σt} are finite-state Markov
chains, discretized from
µt = (1− ρµ)µ¯+ ρµµt−1 + δµυµt and log σt = (1− ρσ)σ¯ + ρσ log σt−1 + δσυσt .
Innovations are iid and standard normal. Using the data in Fagereng et al. (2016b)
on Norwegian financial returns over 1993–2003, we estimate these AR(1) models to
obtain µ¯ = 0.0281, ρµ = 0.5722, δµ = 0.0067, σ¯ = −3.2556, ρσ = 0.2895 and
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δσ = 0.1896. Based on this calibration, the stationary mean and standard deviation
of {Rt} are around 1.03 and 4%, respectively.
To distinguish the effects of stochastic volatility and mean persistence, we consider
two subsidiary models. The first reduces {µt} to its stationary mean µ¯, while the
second reduces {σt} to its stationary mean σ˜ := eσ¯+δ2σ/2(1−ρ2σ). In summary,
logRt = µ¯+ σtζt (Model I)
logRt = µt + σ˜ζt (Model II)
We set β = 0.95 and γ = 1.5. To test the stability properties of Model I, we set K = 5
and explore a neighborhood of the calibrated (ρσ, δσ) values, while in Model II, we
set M = 5 and do likewise for (ρµ, δµ) pairs. In each scenario, other parameters are
fixed to the benchmark. The results are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
In part (a) of each figure, we see that GβR is increasing in the persistence and volatility
parameters of the state process. The intuition behind this feature was explained in
Section 4 for the case of Gβ and is similar here. (Note that GβR = βGR in the
present case, since βt ≡ β is a constant, so GβR has the same shape as GR in terms
of contours.) The dots in the figures show that GβR < 1 at the estimated parameter
values.
Part (b) of each figure shows the set of parameters under which the model is globally
stable and ergodic. The stability threshold is the boundary of the set of parameter
pairs that produce max{GβR, s¯, s¯GR} < 1, where s¯ is given by (20). For such pairs,
Assumptions 2.2 and 3.1 both hold, so the conditions of Theorems 3.1–3.2 are satisfied.
(We are continuing to suppose that Yt is finite or has a positive density, so that
Assumption 3.2 holds. Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 are always valid in the current
setting). Observe that the estimated parameter values (dot points) lie inside the
stable set.
6. Conclusion
We studied an updated version of the income fluctuation problem, the “common
ancestor” of modern macroeconomic theory (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), p. 3.)
Working in a setting where returns on financial assets, non-financial income and impa-
tience are all state dependent and fluctuate over time, we obtained conditions under
which the household savings problem has a unique solution that can be computed by
successive approximations and the wealth process under the optimal savings policy
20
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Figure 2. Stability tests for Model I
has a unique stationary distribution. We also obtained conditions under which wealth
is ergodic and exhibits geometric mixing and asymptotic normality. We investigated
the nature of our conditions and provided methods for testing them in applications.
While our work was motivated by the desire to better understand the joint distribu-
tion of income and wealth, the income fluctuation problem also has applications in
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asset pricing, life-cycle choice, fiscal policy, monetary policy, optimal taxation, and
social security. The ideas contained in this paper should be helpful for those fields
after suitable modifications or extensions.
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Our work leaves several open questions. For example, in the context of an infinite
horizon heterogeneous agent economy, Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2015) prove that
capital income risk drives the heavy upper tail observed in the distribution of wealth.
While capital income risk is iid in that study, the theory presented above allows re-
searchers to model households facing a richer stochastic environment, with stochastic
volatility in returns on savings and time-varying means. If capital income risk gen-
erates inequality, then perhaps time-varying risk can explain changes in inequality.
Exploring such ideas requires embedding our household problem in a larger model
and is left for future research.
Appendix A. Preliminaries
Given a topological space T, let B(T) be the Borel σ-algebra and P(T) be the
probability measures on B(T). A stochastic kernel Π on T is a map Π: T×B(T)→
[0, 1] such that x 7→ Π(x,B) isB(T)-measurable for each B ∈ B(T) and B 7→ Π(x,B)
is a probability measure on B(T) for each x ∈ T. For all t ∈ N, x, y ∈ T and B ∈
B(T), we define Π1 := Π and Πt(x,B) :=
∫
Πt−1(y,B)Π(x, dy). Furthermore, for all
µ ∈P(T), let (µΠt)(B) := ∫ Πt(x,B)µ(dx). Π is called Feller if x 7→ ∫ h(y)Π(x, dy)
is continuous on T whenever h is bounded and continuous on T. We call ψ ∈P(T)
stationary for Π if ψΠ = ψ.
A sequence {µn} ⊂P(T) is called tight, if, for all ε > 0, there exists a compact K ⊂ T
such that µn(T\K) ≤ ε for all n. A stochastic kernel Π is called bounded in probability
if the sequence {Qt(x, ·)}t≥0 is tight for all x ∈ T. Given µ ∈ P(T), we define the
total variation norm ‖µ‖TV := supg:|g|≤1
∣∣∫ g dµ∣∣. Given any measurable map V : T→
[1,∞), we say that Π is V -geometrically mixing if there exist constants M <∞ and
λ < 1 such that, for all x ∈ T and t ≥ 0, the corresponding Markov process {Xt}
satisfies supk≥0;h2, g2≤V |Exg(Xt)h(Xt+k)− [Exg(Xt)] [Exh(Xt+k)]| ≤ λtMV (x).
Below we use (Ω,F ,P) to denote a fixed probability space on which all random
variables are defined. E is expectations with respect to P. The state process {Zt}
and the innovation processes {εt}, {ζt} and {ηt} introduced in (5) live on this space.
In what follows, {Zt} is a stationary version of the chain, where Z0 is drawn from its
unique stationary distribution—henceforth denoted piZ . The marginal distributions
of the innovations are denoted by piε, piζ and piη respectively. We let {Ft} be the
natural filtration generated by {Zt} and the three innovation processes. Pz conditions
on Z0 = z and Ez is expectation under Pz.
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We first prove Lemma 4.1, since its implications will be used immediately below. In
the proof, we consider the matrix Lϕ as a linear operator on R
Z and identify vectors
in RZ with real-valued functions on Z.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. A proof by induction confirms that, for any function h ∈ RZ,
Lnϕ h(z) = Ez
n∏
t=1
ϕth(Zt), (27)
where Lnϕ is the n-th composition of the operator Lϕ with itself (or, equivalently, the
n-th power of the matrix Lϕ). The positivity of Lϕ and Theorem 9.1 of Krasnosel’skii
et al. (2012) imply that r(Lϕ) = limn→∞ ‖Lnϕ h‖1/n when ‖ · ‖ is any norm on RZ and
h is everywhere positive on Z. With h ≡ 1 and ‖f‖ = E|f(Z0)|, this becomes
r(Lϕ) = lim
n→∞
(
ELnϕ 1(Z0)
)1/n
= lim
n→∞
(
EEZ0
n∏
t=1
ϕt
)1/n
= lim
n→∞
(
E
n∏
t=1
ϕt
)1/n
(28)
where the second equality is due to (27) and h = 1 and the third is by the law of
iterated expectations. 
Lemma A.1. Let {ϕt} and Gϕ be as defined in Lemma 4.1. If Gϕ < 1, then there
exists an N in N and a δ < 1 such that maxz∈ZEz
∏n
t=1 ϕt < δ
n whenever n ≥ N .
Proof. Recalling from the proof of Lemma 4.1 that r(Lϕ) = limn→∞ ‖Lnϕ h‖1/n when
‖ · ‖ is any norm on RZ and h is everywhere positive on Z, we can again take h ≡ 1
but now switch to ‖f‖ = maxz∈Z |f(z)|, so that (28) becomes
r(Lϕ) = lim
n→∞
(
max
z∈Z
Lnϕ 1(z)
)1/n
= lim
n→∞
(
max
z∈Z
Ez
n∏
t=1
ϕt
)1/n
. (29)
Since r(Lϕ) = Gϕ and Gϕ < 1, the claim in Lemma A.1 now follows. 
Appendix B. Proof of Section 2 Results
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Pick any a ≥ 0 and z ∈ Z. Since ct = Yt for all t is dominated
by a feasible consumption path, monotonicity of u and the law of iterated expectations
give
max Ez
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
βiu(ct) ≥ Ez
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
βiu(Yt) =
∞∑
t=0
Ez
t∏
i=0
βih(Zt),
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where h(Zt) := EZtu(Y ) and the Monotone Convergence Theorem has been employed
to pass the expectation through the sum. In view of (27) and β0 = 1, we then have
max Ez
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
βiu(ct) ≥
∞∑
t=0
Ltβ h(z). (30)
By the assumed almost sure positivity of βt and the irreducibility of P , the matrix Lβ
is irreducible. Hence, by the Perron–Frobenius Theorem, we can choose an everywhere
positive eigenfunction e such that Lβe = r(Lβ)e. By the everywhere positivity of
u(Yt), the function h is everywhere positive on Z, and hence we can choose α > 0
such that eα := αe is less than h pointwise on Z. We then have
∞∑
t=0
Ltβ h(z) ≥
∞∑
t=0
Ltβ eα(z) = α
∞∑
t=0
r(Lβ)
t e(z).
By lemma 4.1 we know that r(Lβ) ≥ 1, and since α and e are positive, this expres-
sion is infinite. Returning to (30), we see that the value function is infinite at our
arbitrarily chosen pair (a, z). 
For the rest of this section we suppose that Assumptions 2.1–2.3 hold.
Lemma B.1. M1 :=
∑∞
t=0 maxz∈ZEz
∏t
i=1 βi and M2 :=
∑∞
t=0 maxz∈ZEz
∏t
i=1 βiRi,
are finite, as are the constants M3 = maxz∈ZEzY and M4 = maxz∈ZEzu′(Y ).
Proof. That M1 and M2 are finite follows directly from Lemma A.1, with ϕt = βt and
ϕt = βtRt respectively. Regarding M3, Assumption 2.3 states that EY <∞. By the
Law of Iterated Expectations, we can write this as
∑
z∈ZEzY piZ(z) < ∞. As {Zt}
is irreducible, we know that piZ is positive everywhere on Z. Hence, M3 < ∞ must
hold. The proof of M4 <∞ is similar. 
Lemma B.2. For the maximal asset path {a˜t} defined by
a˜t+1 = Rt+1 a˜t + Yt+1 and (a˜0, z˜0) = (a, z) given. (31)
we have, for each (a, z) ∈ S0, that M(a, z) :=
∑∞
t=0Ea,z
∏t
i=0 βi a˜t <∞.
Proof. Iterating backward on (31), we can show that a˜t =
∏t
i=1Ri a+
∑t
j=1 Yj
∏t
i=j+1Ri.
Taking expectation yields
Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi a˜t = Ez
t∏
i=1
βiRi a+
t∑
j=1
Ez
t∏
i=j+1
βiRi
j∏
k=0
βk Yj.
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Then the Monotone Convergence Theorem and the Markov property imply that
M(a, z) =
∞∑
t=0
Ez
t∏
i=1
βiRi a+
∞∑
t=0
t∑
j=1
Ez
t∏
i=j+1
βiRi
j∏
k=0
βk Yj
= Ez
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=1
βiRi a+
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i=0
Ez
j∏
k=0
βk Yj
i∏
`=1
βj+`Rj+`
=
∞∑
t=0
Ez
t∏
i=1
βiRi a+
∞∑
j=1
Ez
j∏
k=0
βk Yj EZj
∞∑
i=0
i∏
`=1
β`R`.
By Lemma B.1, we now have, for all (a, z) ∈ S0,
M(a, z) ≤M2 a+M2
∞∑
t=1
Ez
t∏
i=0
βiYt = M2 a+M2
∞∑
t=1
Ez
t∏
i=0
βiEZtY.
Applying Lemma B.1 again gives M(a, z) <∞, as was to be shown. 
Proposition B.1. The value Vc(a, z) in (8) is well-defined in {−∞} ∪R.
Proof. By the assumptions on the utility function, there exists a constant B ∈ R+
such that u(c) ≤ c + B, and hence Vc(a, z) ≤ Ea,z
∑∞
t=0
∏t
i=0 βi u(a˜t) ≤ M(a, z) +
B
∑∞
t=0Ez
∏t
i=0 βi. The last term is finite by Lemma A.1. 
Proof of Thoerem 2.2. The proof is a long but relatively straightforward extension of
Theorem 1 of Benhabib et al. (2015) and thus omitted. A full proof is available from
the authors upon request. 
Proposition B.2. (C , ρ) is a complete metric space.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of Proposition 4.1 of Li and Stachurski
(2014) and thus omitted. A full proof is available from the authors upon request. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let c be a policy in C satisfying (10). To show that any
asset path generated by c satisfies the transversality condition (11), observe that, by
condition (12), we have
c ∈ C =⇒ ∃M ∈ R+ s.t. u′(a) ≤ (u′ ◦ c)(a, z) ≤ u′(a) +M, ∀(a, z) ∈ S0. (32)
∴ Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi (u
′ ◦ c)(at, Zt)at ≤ Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi u
′(at)at +M Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi at. (33)
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Regarding the first term on the right hand side of (33), fix A > 0 and observe that
u′(at)at = u′(at)at1{at ≤ A}+ u′(at)at1{at > A}
≤ Au′(at) + u′(A)at ≤ Au′(Yt) + u′(A)a˜t
with probability one, where a˜t is the maximal path defined in (31). We then have
Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi u
′(at)at ≤ AEz
t∏
i=0
βi u
′(Yt) + u′(A)Ea,z
t∏
i=0
βi a˜t. (34)
By Lemma B.1, we have
AEz
t∏
i=0
βi u
′(Yt) = AEz
t∏
i=0
βiEZtu
′(Y ) ≤M4AEz
t∏
i=0
βi,
and the last expression converges to zero as t→∞ by Lemma A.1. The second term
in (34) also converges to zero by Lemma B.2. Hence Ea,z
∏t
i=0 βi u
′(at)at → 0 as
t→∞, which, combined with (33) and another application of Lemma B.2, gives our
desired result. 
Proposition B.3. For all c ∈ C and (a, z) ∈ S0, there exists a unique ξ ∈ (0, a] that
solves (14).
Proof. Fix c ∈ C and (a, z) ∈ S0. Because c ∈ C , the map ξ 7→ ψc(ξ, a, z) is
increasing. Since ξ 7→ u′(ξ) is strictly decreasing, the equation (14) can have at most
one solution. Hence uniqueness holds.
Existence follows from the intermediate value theorem provided we can show that
(a) ξ 7→ ψc(ξ, a, z) is a continuous function,
(b) ∃ξ ∈ (0, a] such that u′(ξ) ≥ ψc(ξ, a, z), and
(c) ∃ξ ∈ (0, a] such that u′(ξ) ≤ ψc(ξ, a, z).
For part (a), it suffices to show that
g(ξ) := EzβˆRˆ (u
′ ◦ c) [Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ]
is continuous on (0, a]. To this end, fix ξ ∈ (0, a] and ξn → ξ. By (32) we have
βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ] ≤ βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Yˆ , Zˆ) ≤ βˆRˆu′(Yˆ ) + βˆRˆM. (35)
The last term is integrable, as follows easily from Lemma B.1. Hence the domi-
nated convergence theorem applies. From this fact and the continuity of c, we obtain
g(ξn)→ g(ξ). Hence, ξ 7→ ψc(ξ, a, z) is continuous.
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Part (b) clearly holds, since u′(ξ)→∞ as ξ → 0 and ξ 7→ ψc(ξ, a, z) is increasing and
always finite (since it is continuous as shown in the previous paragraph). Part (c) is
also trivial (just set ξ = a). 
Proposition B.4. We have Tc ∈ C for all c ∈ C .
Proof. Fix c ∈ C and let g (ξ, a, z) := EzβˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ].
Step 1. We show that Tc is continuous. To apply a standard fixed point parametric
continuity result such as Theorem B.1.4 of Stachurski (2009), we first show that ψc
is jointly continuous on the set G defined in (15). This will be true if g is jointly
continuous on G. For any {(ξn, an, zn)} and (ξ, a, z) in G with (ξn, an, zn)→ (ξ, a, z),
we need to show that g(ξn, an, zn)→ g(ξ, a, z). To that end, we define
h1(ξ, a, Zˆ, εˆ, ζˆ, ηˆ), h2(ξ, a, Zˆ, εˆ, ζˆ, ηˆ) := βˆRˆ[u
′(Yˆ ) +M ]± βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ],
where βˆ := β(Zˆ, εˆ), Rˆ := R(Zˆ, ζˆ) and Yˆ := Y (Zˆ, ηˆ) as defined in (5). Then h1 and
h2 are continuous in (ξ, a, Zˆ) by the continuity of c and nonnegative by (35).
By Fatou’s lemma and Theorem 1.1 of Feinberg, Kasyanov, and Zadoianchuk (2014),∫∫∫ ∑
zˆ∈Z
hi(ξ, a, zˆ, εˆ, ζˆ, ηˆ)P (z, zˆ)piε(dεˆ)piζ(dζˆ)piη(dηˆ)
≤
∫∫∫
lim inf
n→∞
∑
zˆ∈Z
hi(ξn, an, zˆ, εˆ, ζˆ, ηˆ)P (zn, zˆ)piε(dεˆ)piζ(dζˆ)piη(dηˆ)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
∫∫∫ ∑
zˆ∈Z
hi(ξn, an, zˆ, εˆ, ζˆ, ηˆ)P (zn, zˆ)piε(dεˆ)piζ(dζˆ)piη(dηˆ).
This implies that
lim inf
n→∞
(
±Ezn βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (an − ξn) + Yˆ , Zˆ]
)
≥
(
±EzβˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ]
)
.
The function g is then continuous, since the above inequality is equivalent to the
statement lim infn→∞ g(ξn, an, zn) ≥ g(ξ, a, z) ≥ lim supn→∞ g(ξn, an, zn). Hence, ψc
is continuous on G, as was to be shown. Moreover, since ξ 7→ ψc(ξ, a, z) takes values
in the closed interval I(a, z) := [u′(a), u′(a) +EzβˆRˆ(u′(Yˆ ) +M)], and the correspon-
dence (a, z) 7→ I(a, z) is nonempty, compact-valued and continuous, Theorem B.1.4
of Stachurski (2009) then implies that Tc is continuous on S0.
Step 2. We show that Tc is increasing in a. Suppose that for some z ∈ Z and
a1, a2 ∈ (0,∞) with a1 < a2, we have ξ1 := Tc(a1, z) > Tc(a2, z) =: ξ2. Since c
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is increasing in a by assumption, ψc is increasing in ξ and decreasing in a. Then
u′(ξ1) < u′(ξ2) = ψc(ξ2, a2, z) ≤ ψc(ξ1, a1, z) = u′(ξ1). This is a contradiction.
Step 3. We have shown in Proposition B.3 that Tc(a, z) ∈ (0, a] for all (a, z) ∈ S0.
Step 4. We show that ‖u′ ◦ (Tc)− u′‖ <∞. Since u′[Tc(a, z)] ≥ u′(a), we have
|u′[Tc(a, z)]− u′(a)| = u′[Tc(a, z)]− u′(a)
≤ EzβˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ[a− Tc(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ) ≤ EzβˆRˆ[u′(Yˆ ) +M ]
for all (a, z) ∈ S0. The right hand side is easily shown to be finite via Lemma B.1. 
Next, we aim to prove Theorem 2.3. RecallH defined in the proof of Proposition B.2.
Given h ∈H , let T˜ h be the function mapping (a, z) ∈ S0 into the κ that solves
κ = max{Ez βˆRˆ h(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(κ)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}. (36)
The next lemma implies that T˜ is a well-defined self-map on H , as well as topologi-
cally conjugate to T under the bijection H : C →H defined by Hc := u′ ◦ c.
Lemma B.3. The operator T˜ : H →H and satisfies T˜H = HT on C .
Proof. Pick any c ∈ C and (a, z) ∈ S0. Let ξ := Tc(a, z), then ξ solves
u′(ξ) = max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [Rˆ (a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ], u′(a)}. (37)
We need to show that HTc and T˜Hc evaluate to the same number at (a, z). In other
words, we need to show that u′(ξ) is the solution to
κ = max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(κ)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}.
But this is immediate from (37). Hence, we have shown that T˜H = HT on C . Since
H : C → H is a bijection, we have T˜ = HTH−1. Since in addition T : C → C by
Proposition B.4, we have T˜ : H →H . This concludes the proof. 
Lemma B.4. T˜ is order preserving on H . That is, T˜ h1 ≤ T˜ h2 for all h1, h2 ∈ H
with h1 ≤ h2.
Proof. Let h1, h2 be functions inH with h1 ≤ h2. Suppose to the contrary that there
exists (a, z) ∈ S0 such that κ1 := T˜ h1(a, z) > T˜h2(a, z) =: κ2. Since functions in H
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are decreasing in the first argument, we have
κ1 = max{Ez βˆRˆ h1(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(κ1)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ h2(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(κ1)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ h2(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(κ2)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)} = κ2.
This is a contradiction. Hence, T˜ is order preserving. 
Lemma B.5. There exists an n ∈ N and θ < 1 such that T˜ n is a contraction mapping
of modulus θ on (H , d∞).
Proof. Since T˜ is order preserving andH is closed under the addition of nonnegative
constants, based on Blackwell (1965), it remains to verify the existence of n ∈ N and
θ < 1 such that T˜ n(h+ γ) ≤ T˜ nh+ θγ for all h ∈H and γ ≥ 0. By Lemma A.1 and
Assumption 2.2, it suffices to show that for all k ∈ N and (a, z) ∈ S0, we have
T˜ k(h+ γ)(a, z) ≤ T˜ kh(a, z) + γEz
k∏
i=1
βiRi. (38)
Fix h ∈H , γ ≥ 0, and let hγ(a, z) := h(a, z) + γ. By the definition of T˜ , we have
T˜ hγ(a, z) = max{Ez βˆRˆ hγ(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ hγ)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ h(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ hγ)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}+ γEzβ1R1
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ h(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ h)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}+ γEzβ1R1.
Here, the first inequality is elementary and the second is due to the fact that h ≤ hγ
and T˜ is order preserving. Hence, T˜ (h+γ)(a, z) ≤ T˜ h(a, z)+γEzβ1R1 and (38) holds
for k = 1. Suppose (38) holds for arbitrary k. It remains to show that it holds for
k + 1. For z ∈ Z, define f(z) := γEzβ1R1 · · · βkRk. By the induction hypothesis, the
monotonicity of T˜ and the Markov property,
T˜ k+1hγ(a, z) = max{Ez βˆRˆ (T˜ khγ)(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ k+1hγ)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ (T˜ kh+ f)(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ k+1hγ)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ (T˜ kh)(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ k+1hγ)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
+Ez β1R1f(Z1)
≤ max{Ez βˆRˆ (T˜ kh)(Rˆ [a− (u′)−1(T˜ k+1h)(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}
+ γEz β1R1EZ1β1R1 · · · βkRk
= T˜ k+1h(a, z) + γEz β1R1 · · · βk+1Rk+1.
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Hence, (38) is verified by induction. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let n and θ be as in Lemma B.5. In view of Propositions 2.1,
B.2 and B.4, to show that T n is a contraction and verify claims (1)–(3) of Theo-
rem 2.3, based on the Banach contraction mapping theorem, it suffices to show that
ρ(T nc, T nd) ≤ θρ(c, d) for all c, d ∈ C . To this end, pick any c, d ∈ C . Note that
the topological conjugacy result established in Lemma B.3 implies that T˜ = HTH−1.
Hence, T˜ n = (HTH−1) · · · (HTH−1) = HT nH−1 and T˜ nH = HT n. By the definition
of ρ and the contraction property established in Lemma B.5,
ρ(T nc, T nd) = d∞(HT nc,HT nd) = d∞(T˜ nHc, T˜ nHd) ≤ θd∞(Hc,Hd) = θρ(c, d).
Hence, T n is a contraction and claims (1)–(3) are verified. 
Our next goal is to prove Proposition 2.2. To begin with, we define
C ′ = {c ∈ C : a 7→ a− c(a, z) is increasing in a} .
Lemma B.6. C ′ is a closed subset of C , and Tc ∈ C ′ for all c ∈ C ′.
Proof. To see that C ′ is closed, for a given sequence {cn} in C ′ and c ∈ C with
ρ(cn, c)→ 0, we need to show that c ∈ C ′. This obviously holds since a 7→ a−cn(a, z)
is increasing for all n, and, in addition, ρ(cn, c) → 0 implies that cn(a, z) → c(a, z)
for all (a, z) ∈ S0.
Fix c ∈ C ′. We now show that ξ := Tc ∈ C ′. Since ξ ∈ C by Proposition B.4, it
remains to show that a 7→ a − ξ(a, z) is increasing. Suppose the claim is false, then
there exist z ∈ Z and a1, a2 ∈ (0,∞) such that a1 < a2 and a1−ξ(a1, z) > a2−ξ(a2, z).
Since a1 − ξ(a1, z) ≥ 0, a2 − ξ(a2, z) ≥ 0 and ξ(a1, z) ≤ ξ(a2, z) by Proposition B.4,
we have ξ(a1, z) < a1 and ξ(a1, z) < ξ(a2, z). However, based on the property of the
time iteration operator, we then have
(u′ ◦ ξ)(a1, z) = EzβˆRˆ(u′ ◦ c)(Rˆ [a1 − ξ(a1, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ)
≤ EzβˆRˆ(u′ ◦ c)(Rˆ [a2 − ξ(a2, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ) ≤ (u′ ◦ ξ)(a2, z),
which implies that ξ(a1, z) ≥ ξ(a2, z). This is a contradiction. Hence, a 7→ a− ξ(a, z)
is increasing, and T is a self-map on C ′. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Since T is a self-map on the closed subset C ′ by Lemma B.6
and Tc∗ = c∗, we have c∗ ∈ C ′ by Theorem 2.3. Hence, the stated claims hold. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let Tj be the time iteration operator for the income process
j established in Proposition B.4. It suffices to show T1c ≤ T2c for all c ∈ C . To see
this, note that by Lemma B.4, we have Tjc1 ≤ Tjc2 whenever c1 ≤ c2. Therefore if
T1c ≤ T2c for all c ∈ C , we obtain T1c1 ≤ T1c2 ≤ T2c2. Iterating this starting from
any c ∈ C , by Theorem 2.3, it follows that c∗1 = limn→∞(T1)nc ≤ limn→∞(T2)nc = c∗2,
completing the proof.
To show that T1c ≤ T2c for any c ∈ C , take any (a, z) ∈ S0 and define ξj = (Tjc)(a, z).
To show ξ1 ≤ ξ2, suppose on the contrary that ξ1 > ξ2. Since c is increasing in a and
u′′ < 0 (hence u′ is decreasing), it follows from the definition of the time iteration
operator in (14)–(16), Y1 ≤ Y2, u′′ < 0 and the monotonicity of c ∈ C that
u′(ξ2) > u′(ξ1) = max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c)[Rˆ(a− ξ1) + Yˆ1, Zˆ], u′(a)}
≥ max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c)[Rˆ(a− ξ2) + Yˆ2, Zˆ], u′(a)} = u′(ξ2),
which is a contradiction. 
To prove Proposition 2.4, we need several lemmas.
Lemma B.7. For all c ∈ C , there exists a threshold a¯c(z) such that Tc(a, z) = a if
and only if a ≤ a¯c(z). In particular, there exists a threshold a¯(z) such that c∗(a, z) = a
if and only if a ≤ a¯(z).
Proof. Recall that, for all c ∈ C , ξ(a, z) := Tc(a, z) solves
(u′ ◦ ξ) (a, z) = max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}. (39)
For each z ∈ Z and c ∈ C , define
a¯c(z) := (u
′)−1 [Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Yˆ , Zˆ)] and a¯(z) := a¯c∗(z). (40)
Let a ≤ a¯c(z). We claim that ξ(a, z) = a. Suppose to the contrary that ξ(a, z) < a.
Then (u′ ◦ ξ)(a, z) > u′(a). In view of (39), we have
u′(a) < Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ) ≤ Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Yˆ , Zˆ) = u′[a¯c(z)].
From this we get a > a¯c(z), which is a contradiction. Hence, ξ(a, z) = a.
On the other hand, if ξ(a, z) = a, then (u′ ◦ ξ)(a, z) = u′(a). By (39), we have
u′(a) ≥ Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Yˆ , Zˆ) = u′[a¯c(z)]. Hence, a ≤ a¯c(z). The first claim is verified.
The second claim follows immediately from the first claim and the fact that c∗ is the
unique fixed point of T in C . 
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Consider a subset C1 defined by C1 := {c ∈ C : a 7→ c(a, z) is concave for all z ∈ Z}.
Lemma B.8. C1 is a closed subset of C , and, Tc ∈ C1 for all c ∈ C1.
Proof. The first claim is immediate because limits of concave functions are concave.
To prove the second claim, fix c ∈ C1. We have Tc ∈ C since T is a self-map on C .
It remains to show that a 7→ ξ(a, z) := Tc(a, z) is concave for all z ∈ Z. Given z ∈ Z,
Lemma B.7 implies that ξ(a, z) = a for a ≤ a¯c(z) and that ξ(a, z) < a for a > a¯c(z).
Since in addition a 7→ ξ(a, z) is continuous and increasing, to show the concavity of
ξ with respect to a, it suffices to show that a 7→ ξ(a, z) is concave on (a¯c(z),∞).
Suppose there exist some z ∈ Z, α ∈ [0, 1], and a1, a2 ∈ (a¯c(z),∞) such that
ξ ((1− α)a1 + αa2, z) < (1− α)ξ(a1, z) + αξ(a2, z). (41)
Let h(a, z, ωˆ) := Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + Yˆ , where ωˆ := (Rˆ, Yˆ ). Then by Lemma B.7 and
noting that consumption is interior, we have
(u′ ◦ ξ) ((1− α)a1 + αa2, z) = Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) {h[(1− α)a1 + αa2, z, ωˆ], Zˆ}
≤ Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) [(1− α)h(a1, z, ωˆ) + αh(a2, z, ωˆ), Zˆ].
Using condition (17) then yields
ξ((1− α)a1 + αa2, z) ≥ (u′)−1{Ez βˆRˆ(u′ ◦ c)[(1− α)h(a1, z, ωˆ) + αh(a2, z, ωˆ), Zˆ]}
≥ (1− α)(u′)−1{Ez βˆRˆ(u′ ◦ c)[h(a1, z, ωˆ), Zˆ]}+ α(u′)−1{Ez βˆRˆ(u′ ◦ c)[h(a2, z, ωˆ), Zˆ]}
= (1− α)(u′)−1{(u′ ◦ ξ)(a1, z)}+ α(u′)−1{(u′ ◦ ξ)(a2, z)} = (1− α)ξ(a1, z) + αξ(a2, z),
which contradicts (41). Hence, a 7→ ξ(a, z) is concave for all z ∈ Z. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. By Theorem 2.3, T : C → C is a contraction mapping with
unique fixed point c∗. Since C1 is a closed subset of C and T : C1 → C1 by Lemma B.8,
we know that c∗ ∈ C1. The first claim is verified. Regarding the second claim, note
that c∗ ∈ C1 implies that a 7→ c∗(a, z) is increasing and concave for all z ∈ Z. Hence,
a 7→ c∗(a, z)/a is a decreasing function for all z ∈ Z. Since 0 ≤ c∗(a, z) ≤ a for all
(a, z) ∈ S0, α(z) := lima→∞ c∗(a, z)/a is well-defined and α(z) ∈ [0, 1]. 
Proof of Remark 2.1. For each c in C concave in the first argument, let hc(x, ωˆ) :=
c(Rˆx + Yˆ , zˆ), where ωˆ := (Rˆ, Yˆ , zˆ). Then x 7→ hc(x, ωˆ) is concave. Based on the
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generalized Minkowski’s inequality (see, e.g., Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1952),
page 146, theorem 198), we have
[Ez βˆRˆ hc(αx1 + (1− α)x2, ωˆ)−γ]−
1
γ ≥ {Ez βˆRˆ [αhc(x1, ωˆ) + (1− α)hc(x2, ωˆ)]−γ}−
1
γ
= {Ez[α(βˆRˆ)−
1
γ hc(x1, ωˆ) + (1− α)(βˆRˆ)−
1
γ hc(x2, ωˆ) ]
−γ}− 1γ
≥ (Ez[α(βˆRˆ)−
1
γ hc(x1, ωˆ)]
−γ)−
1
γ + (Ez[(1− α)(βˆRˆ)−
1
γ hc(x2, ωˆ)]
−γ)−
1
γ
= α[Ez βˆRˆ hc(x1, ωˆ)
−γ]−
1
γ + (1− α)[Ez βˆRˆ hc(x2, ωˆ)−γ]−
1
γ ,
Since u′(c) = c−γ, the above inequality implies that condition (17) holds. 
To prove Proposition 2.5, let s¯ be as in (19) and define
C2 := {c ∈ C : c(a, z) ≥ (1− s¯)a for all (a, z) ∈ S0} . (42)
Lemma B.9. C2 is a closed subset of C , and Tc ∈ C2 for all c ∈ C2.
Proof. To see that C2 is closed, for a given sequence {cn} in C2 and c ∈ C with
ρ(cn, c) → 0, we need to verify that c ∈ C2. This obviously holds since cn(a, z)/a ≥
1 − s¯ for all n and (a, z) ∈ S0, and, on the other hand, ρ(cn, c) → 0 implies that
cn(a, z)→ c(a, z) for all (a, z) ∈ S0.
We next show that T is a self-map on C2. Fix c ∈ C2. We have Tc ∈ C since T is
a self-map on C . It remains to show that ξ := Tc satisfies ξ(a, z) ≥ (1 − s¯)a for all
(a, z) ∈ S0. Suppose ξ(a, z) < (1− s¯)a for some (a, z) ∈ S0. Then
u′((1− s¯)a) < (u′ ◦ ξ)(a, z) = max{Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ), u′(a)}.
Since u′((1− s¯)a) > u′(a) and c ∈ C2, this implies that
u′((1− s¯)a) < Ez βˆRˆ (u′ ◦ c) (Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + Yˆ , Zˆ)
≤ Ez βˆRˆ u′ {(1− s¯)Rˆ [a− ξ(a, z)] + (1− s¯)Yˆ }
≤ Ez βˆRˆ u′ [(1− s¯)Rˆs¯a+ (1− s¯)Yˆ ] ≤ Ez βˆRˆ u′ [Rˆs¯(1− s¯)a],
which contradicts (19) since ((1 − s¯)a, z) ∈ S0. Hence, ξ(a, z)/a ≥ 1 − s¯ for all
(a, z) ∈ S0 and we conclude that Tc ∈ C2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5. We have shown in Theorem 2.3 that T is a contraction
mapping on the complete metric space (C , ρ), with unique fixed point c∗. Since in
addition C2 is a closed subset of C and TC2 ⊂ C2 by Lemma B.9, we know that
c∗ ∈ C2. The stated claim is verified. 
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Appendix C. Proof of Section 3 Results
As before, Assumptions 2.1–2.3 are in force. Notice that Assumption 2.2, Assump-
tion 3.1 and Lemma A.1 imply existence of an n in N such that
θ := max
z∈Z
Ez
n∏
t=1
βtRt < 1 and γ := s¯
n max
z∈Z
Ez
n∏
t=1
Rt < 1. (43)
Lemma C.1. For all (a, z) ∈ S, we have supt≥0Ea,z at <∞.
Proof. Since c∗(0, z) = 0, Proposition 2.5 implies that c∗(a, z) ≥ (1 − s¯)a for all
(a, z) ∈ S. For all t ≥ 1, we have t = kn+ j in general, where the integers k ≥ 0 and
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. Using these facts and (4), we have:
at ≤ s¯tRt · · ·R1a+ s¯t−1Rt · · ·R2Y1 + · · ·+ s¯RtYt−1 + Yt
= s¯kn+jRkn+j · · ·R1a+
j∑
`=1
s¯kn+j−`Rkn+j · · ·R`+1Y`
+
k∑
m=1
n∑
`=1
s¯mn−`Rkn+j · · ·R(k−m)n+j+`+1Y(k−m)n+j+`
with probability one. Taking expectations of the above while noting that M0 :=
max1≤`≤n, z∈ZEz
∏`
t=1Rt <∞ by Assumption 3.1 and Lemma A.1, we have
Ea,zat ≤ γks¯jEzRj · · ·R1a+ γk
j∑
`=1
s¯j−`EzRj · · ·R`+1Y`
+
k−1∑
m=0
γm
n∑
`=1
s¯n−`EzR(k−m)n+j · · ·R(k−m−1)n+j+`+1Y(k−m)n+j+`
≤ γkM0a+ γkM0
j∑
`=1
EzY` +
k−1∑
m=0
γmM0
n∑
`=1
EzY(k−m−1)n+j+`
≤M0a+M0M3n+
∞∑
m=0
γmM0M3n <∞.
or all (a, z) ∈ S and t ≥ 0. Here we have used M3 in Lemma B.1 and the Markov
property. Hence, supt≥0Ea,z at <∞ for all (a, z) ∈ S, as was claimed. 
A function w∗ : S → R+ is called norm-like if all its sublevel sets (i.e., sets of the
form {x ∈ S : w(x) ≤ b}, b ∈ R+) are precompact in S (i.e., any sequence in a given
sublevel set has a subsequence that converges to a point of S).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. Based on Lemma D.5.3 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009), a sto-
chastic kernel Q is bounded in probability if and only if for all x ∈ S, there exists a
norm-like function w∗x : S → R+ such that the (Q, x)-Markov process {Xt}t≥0 satis-
fies lim supt→∞Ex [w
∗
x(Xt)] < ∞. Fix (a, z) ∈ S. Since Z is finite, P is bounded
in probability. Hence, there exists a norm-like function w : Z → R+ such that
lim supt→∞Ezw(Zt) < ∞. Then w∗ : S → R+ defined by w∗(a0, Z0) := a0 + w(Z0)
is a norm-like function on S. The stochastic kernel Q is then bounded in prob-
ability since Lemma C.1 implies that lim supt→∞Ea,z w
∗(at, Zt) ≤ supt≥0Ea,z at +
lim supt→∞Ez w(Zt) <∞. Regarding existence of stationary distribution, since P is
Feller (due to the finiteness of Z), whenever zn → z, the product measure satisfies
P (zn, ·)⊗ piζ ⊗ piη w−→ P (z, ·)⊗ piζ ⊗ piη.
Since in addition c∗ is continuous, a simple application of the generalized Fatou’s
lemma of Feinberg, Kasyanov, and Zadoianchuk (2014) (Theorem 1.1) shows that the
stochastic kernel Q is Feller. Moreover, since Q is bounded in probability, based on the
Krylov-Bogolubov theorem (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2009), Proposition 12.1.3
and Lemma D.5.3), Q admits at least one stationary distribution. 
Lemma C.2. The borrowing constraint binds in finite time with positive probability.
That is, for all (a, z) ∈ S, we have Pa,z (∪t≥0{ct = at}) > 0.
Proof. The claim holds trivially when a = 0. Suppose the claim does not hold on S0
(recall that S0 = S\{0}), then Pa,z (∩t≥0{ct < at}) = 1 for some (a, z) ∈ S0, i.e., the
borrowing constraint never binds with probability one. Hence,
Pa,z
{
(u′ ◦ c)(at, Zt) = E
[
βt+1Rt+1(u
′ ◦ c)(at+1, Zt+1)
∣∣Ft]} = 1
for all t ≥ 0. Then we have
(u′ ◦ c) (a, z) = Ea,z β1R1 · · · βtRt (u′ ◦ c) (at, Zt)
≤ Ea,z β1R1 · · · βtRt [u′(at) +M ] ≤ Ez β1R1 · · · βtRt [u′(Yt) +M ] (44)
for all t ≥ 1. Let n and θ be defined by (43). Let t = kn + 1. Based on the Markov
property and Lemma B.1, as t→∞,
Ezβ1R1 · · · βtRt = Ezβ1R1 · · · βt−1Rt−1EZt−1β1R1
≤
(
max
z∈Z
Ezβ1R1
)
(Ezβ1R1 · · · βnkRnk) ≤
(
max
z∈Z
Ezβ1R1
)
θk → 0.
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Similarly, as t→∞,
Ez β1R1 · · · βtRtu′(Yt) = Ez β1R1 · · · βt−1Rt−1EZt−1 [β1R1u′(Y1)]
≤
[
max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆu
′(Yˆ )
]
Ezβ1R1 · · · βnkRnk ≤
[
max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆu
′(Yˆ )
]
θk → 0.
Letting t → ∞. (44) implies that (u′ ◦ c) (a, z) ≤ 0, contradicted with the fact that
u′ > 0. Thus, we must have Pa,z (∪t≥0{ct = at}) > 0 for all (a, z) ∈ S. 
Our next goal is to prove Theorem 3.2. In proofs we apply the theory of Meyn and
Tweedie (2009). Important definitions (their information in the textbook) include:
ψ-irreducibility (Section 4.2), small set (page 102), strong aperiodicity (page 114),
petite set (page 117), Harris chain (page 199), and positivity (page 230).
Recall that Rm paired with its Euclidean topology is a second countable topological
space (i.e., its topology has a countable base). Since R+ and Z are respectively
Borel subsets of R and Rm paired with the relative topologies, they are also second
countable. Hence, S := R+ × Z satisfies B(S) = B(R+)⊗B(Z) (see, e.g., page 149,
Theorem 4.44 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Recall (22). With slight abuse of
notation, in proofs, we use f to denote the density of {Yt} in both cases (Y1) and
(Y2) and write dy = ν(dy), where ν is the related measure. Specifically, ν is the
Lebesgue measure when (Y2) holds. Moreover, Let ϑ be the counting measure.
Recall z¯ ∈ Z and the greatest lower bound y` ≥ 0 of the support of {Yt} given by
Assumption 3.2. Let p¯ := P (z¯, z¯). Then p¯ > 0 by Assumption 3.2.
Lemma C.3. P(a,z¯) {∪t≥0 [{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})]} > 0 for all a ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. Fix a ∈ (0,∞). If a ≤ a¯(z¯), the claim holds trivially by Lemma B.7. Now
consider the case a > a¯(z¯). Suppose P(a,z¯) {∪t≥0 [{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})]} = 0.
Then, based on the De Morgan’s law, we have
P(a,z¯)
{∩t≥0 [{ct < at} ∪ (∪ti=0{Zi 6= z¯})]} = 1.
∴ P(a,z¯)
{{ct < at} ∪ (∪ti=0{Zi 6= z¯})} = 1 for all t ∈ N.
Note that the set 4(t) := {ct < at} ∪ (∪ti=0{Zi 6= z¯}) can be written as
4(t) = 41(t) ∪42(t), where 41(t) ∩42(t) = ∅,
41(t) := {ct < at} ∩
(∩ti=0{Zi = z¯}) and 42(t) := ∪ti=0{Zi 6= z¯}.
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Assumption 3.2 then implies that, for all t ≥ 0,
P(a,z¯){41(t)} = 1−Pz¯{42(t)} = Pz¯
{∩ti=0{Zi = z¯}} ≥ p¯t > 0.
Let n and θ be defined by (43) and let t = kn+1. Similar to the proof of Lemma B.7,
we can show that, with probability p¯t > 0,
(u′ ◦ c∗)(a, z¯) ≤ θk
[
max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆu
′(Yˆ ) +M max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆ
]
for some constant M ∈ R+. Since θ ∈ (0, 1) and (u′ ◦ c∗)(a, z¯) > 0, Lemma B.1
implies that there exists N ∈ N such that
θN
[
max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆu
′(Yˆ ) +M max
z∈Z
EzβˆRˆ
]
< (u′ ◦ c∗)(a, z¯).
As a result, we have (u′ ◦ c∗)(a, z¯) < (u′ ◦ c∗)(a, z¯) with probability p¯Nn+1 > 0. This
is a contradiction. Hence the stated claim is verified. 
Lemma C.4. The Markov process {(at, Zt)}t≥0 is ψ-irreducible.
Proof. Fix (a, z) ∈ S. Since {zt} is irreducible, we have Pz{ZN0 = z¯} > 0 for some
integer N0 ≥ 0. Moreover, by Lemma C.3, for all a′ ∈ (0,∞), there exists N ≥ N0
such that P(a′,z¯) {cT = aT , ZT = z¯} ≥ P(a′,z¯)
{
cT = aT , ∩Ti=0{Zi = z¯}
}
> 0, where
T := N −N0. Hence, the Markov property implies that
P(a,z)(E) = Q
N((a, z), E) > 0, where E := {cN = aN , ZN = z¯} . (45)
Recall δ > y` given by Assumption 3.2. Let D ∈ B(S) be defined by D := {y`}×{z¯} if
(Y1) holds and D := (y`, δ)×{z¯} if (Y2) holds. We define the measure ϕ on B(S) by
ϕ(A) := (ν×ϑ)(A∩D) for A ∈ B(S). Clearly ϕ is a nontrivial measure. In particular,
ϑ({z¯}) = 1 as ϑ is the counting measure. Moreover, since y` is the greatest lower
bound of the support of {Yt}, it must be the case that ν({y`}) > 0 if (Y1) holds and
that ν((y`, δ)) > 0 if (Y2) holds. As a result, ϕ(S) = ν({y`})×ϑ({z¯}) > 0 when (Y1)
holds and ϕ(S) = ν((y`, δ))× ϑ({z¯}) > 0 when (Y2) holds.
For all A ∈ B(S) with ϕ(A) > 0, based on (21a),
P(a,z){(aN+1, ZN+1) ∈ A} ≥ P(a,z) {(aN+1, ZN+1) ∈ A, aN = cN , ZN = z¯}
= P(a,z) {(aN+1, ZN+1) ∈ A | aN = cN , ZN = z¯} P(a,z)(E)
= P(a,z) {(YN+1, ZN+1) ∈ A, aN = cN , ZN = z¯} . (46)
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Note that, by Assumption 3.2, f(y′′ | z′′)P (z¯, z′′) > 0 whenever (y′′, z′′) ∈ D. Since in
addition ϕ(A) = (ν × ϑ)(A ∩ D) > 0, we have∫
A
f(y′′ | z′′)P (z¯, z′′)(ν × ϑ)[d(y′′, z′′)] > 0.
Let 4 := P(a,z){(aN+1, ZN+1) ∈ A}. Then (45) and (46) imply that
4 ≥
∫
E
{∫
A
f(y′′ | z′′)P (z′, z′′)(ν × ϑ)[d(y′′, z′′)]
}
QN ((a, z), d(a′, z′)) > 0.
Therefore, we have shown that any measurable subset with positive ϕ measure can be
reached in finite time with positive probability, i.e., {(at, Zt)} is ϕ-irreducible. Based
on Proposition 4.2.2 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009), there exists a maximal probability
measure ψ on B(S) such that {(at, Zt)} is ψ-irreducible. 
Lemma C.5. Let the function a¯ be defined as in (40). Then a¯(z¯) ≥ y` if (Y1) holds,
while a¯(z¯) > y` if (Y2) holds.
Proof. Suppose (Y1) holds and a¯(z¯) < y`. Then, by Lemma B.7, for all t ∈ N,[{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})] = [{at ≤ a¯(Zt)} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})]
⊂ [{at < y`} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})] ⊂ {at < y`}. (47)
Hence, for all a ∈ (a¯(z¯),∞), c0 < a0 by Lemma B.7, and, for all t ∈ N,
P(a,z¯)
[{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})] ≤ P(a,z¯){at < y`} = 0,
where the last equality follows from (21a), which implies that at ≥ Yt ≥ y` with
probability one. This is contradicted with Lemma C.3.
Suppose (Y2) holds and a¯(z¯) ≤ y`. By definition, Pz{Yt ≤ y`} = 0 for all z ∈ Z
and t ∈ N. Since at ≥ Yt with probability one, we have P(a,z){at ≤ y`} = 0 for
all (a, z) ∈ S and t ∈ N. Via similar analysis to (47), Lemma B.7 implies that
[{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})] ⊂ {at ≤ y`} for all t ∈ N. Hence, for all a ∈ (a¯(z¯),∞),
c0 < a0 by Lemma B.7, and, for all t ∈ N, P(a,z¯) [{ct = at} ∩ (∩ti=0{Zi = z¯})] ≤
P(a,z¯){at ≤ y`} = 0. Again, this contradicts Lemma C.3. 
Lemma C.6. The Markov process {(at, Zt)}t≥0 is strongly aperiodic.
Proof. By the definition of strong aperiodicity, we need to show that there exists a
v1-small set D1 with v1(D1) > 0, i.e., there exists a nontrivial measure v1 on B(S)
and a subset D1 ∈ B(S) such that v1(D1) > 0 and
inf
(a,z)∈D1
Q ((a, z), A) ≥ v1 (A) for all A ∈ B(S). (48)
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For δ > 0 given by Assumption 3.2, let C := (y`,min {δ, a¯(z)}) and let D1 := {y`}×{z¯}
if (Y1) holds and D1 := C × {z¯} if (Y2) holds. We now show that D1 satisfies the
above conditions. Define r(a′, z′) := f(a′ | z′)P (z¯, z′) and note that r(a′, z′) > 0 on
D1. Define the measure v1 on B(S) by v1(A) :=
∫
A
r(a′, z′)(ν × ϑ)[d(a′, z′)]. If (Y1)
holds, then ν({y`}) > 0 as shown above, and, if (Y2) holds, Lemma C.5 implies
that ν(C) > 0. Since in addition ϑ({z¯}) > 0, it always holds that (ν × ϑ)(D1) > 0.
Moreover, since r(a′, z′) > 0 on D1, we have v1(D1) > 0 and v1 is a nontrivial measure.
For all (a, z) ∈ D1 and A ∈ B(S), Lemma B.7 implies that
Q ((a, z), A) =
∫
A
r(a′, z′)(ν × ϑ)[d(a′, z′)] = v1(A).
Hence, D1 satisfies (48) and {(at, Zt)}t≥0 is strongly aperiodic. 
Let F (dat+1 | at, Zt, Zt+1) be defined such thatP{at+1 ∈ A | (at, Zt, Zt+1) = (a, z, z′)} =∫
1{a′ ∈ A}F (da′ | a, z, z′) at A ∈ B(R+).
Lemma C.7. Let h : S → R+ be an integrable map such that a 7→ h(a, z) is de-
creasing for all z ∈ Z. Then, for all t ∈ N and z ∈ Z, the map a 7→ `(a, z, t) :=∫
h(a′, z′)Qt((a, z), d(a′, z′)) is decreasing.
Proof. Fix z ∈ Z. When t = 1, (21a) implies that
`(a, z, 1) =
∫ [∫
h(a′, z′)F (da′ | a, z, z′)
]
P (z, z′)ϑ(dz′).
Since a 7→ h(a, z) is decreasing, and by Proposition 2.2 and (21a), the optimal asset
accumulation path at+1 is increasing in at with probability one, we know that a 7→∫
h(a′, z′)F (da′ | a, z, z′) is decreasing for all z′ ∈ Z. Thus, a 7→ `(a, z, 1) is decreasing.
The claim holds for t = 1. Suppose this claim holds for arbitrary t, it remains to
show that it holds for t+ 1. Note that
`(a, z, t+ 1) =
∫∫
h(a′′, z′′)Qt((a′, z′), d(a′′, z′′))Q((a, z), d(a′, z′))
=
∫
`(a′, z′, t)Q((a, z), d(a′, z′)).
Since a′ 7→ `(a′, z′, t) is decreasing for all z′ ∈ Z, based on the induction argument,
a 7→ `(a, z, t+ 1) is decreasing. The stated claim then follows. 
Lemma C.8. The set [0, d]× Z is a petite set for all d ∈ R+.
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Proof. Fix d ∈ (0,∞) and z ∈ Z. Let B := [0, d]× {z}. By Lemma C.3,
P(d,z){cN−1 = aN−1, ZN−1 = z¯} > 0 for some N ∈ N. (49)
We start by showing that there exists a nontrivial measure vN on B(S) such that
inf
(a,z)∈B
QN((a, z), A) ≥ vN(A) for all A ∈ B(S). (50)
In other words, B is a vN -small set. Fix A ∈ B(S). For all z′ ∈ Z, define
m(z′) :=
∫ [∫
1{(y′′, z′′) ∈ A}f(y′′ | z′′) dy′′
]
P (z′, z′′)ϑ(dz′′).
Note that for all (a, z) ∈ B, Lemma B.7 implies that
QN((a, z), A) ≥ Pa,z {(YN , ZN) ∈ A, aN−1 ≤ a¯(ZN−1), ZN−1 = z¯}
=
∫
m(z′)1{a′ ≤ a¯(z′), z′ = z¯}QN−1((a, z), d(a′, z′)).
Since a′ 7→ m(z′)1{a′ ≤ a¯(z′), z′ = z¯} is decreasing for all z′ ∈ Z, by Lemma C.7,
QN((a, z), A) ≥
∫
m(z′)1{a′ ≤ a¯(z′), z′ = z¯}QN−1((d, z), d(a′, z′))
= Pd,z {(YN , ZN) ∈ A, cN−1 = aN−1, ZN−1 = z¯} =: vN(A).
Note that vN is a nontrivial measure on B(S) since (49) implies that vN(S) > 0.
Furthermore, since (a, z) is chosen arbitrarily, the above inequality implies that (50)
holds. We have shown that B is a vN -small set, and hence a petite set. Since finite
union of petite sets is petite for ψ-irreducible chains (see, e.g., Proposition 5.5.5 of
Meyn and Tweedie (2009)), the set [0, d]× Z must also be petite. 
Recall s¯ ∈ [0, 1) in Assumption 3.1, n ∈ N and γ ∈ (0, 1) in (43). Let B := [0, d]× Z.
Lemma C.9. There exist constants b ∈ R+, ρ ∈ (0, 1) and a measurable map V : S→
[n/ρ,∞) that is bounded on B, such that, for sufficiently large d ∈ R+ and all (a, z) ∈
S, we have Ea,zV (an, Zn)− V (a, z) ≤ −ρV (a, z) + b1{(a, z) ∈ B}.
Proof. Since c∗(a, z) ≥ (1 − s¯)a by Proposition 2.5 and M0 := maxz∈ZEzRˆ < ∞ by
Assumption 3.1 and Lemma A.1, by Lemma B.1 and the Markov property,
Ea,zan ≤ s¯nEzRn · · ·R1a+
n∑
t=1
s¯n−tEzRn · · ·Rt+1Yt
≤ γa+
n∑
t=1
s¯n−tEzYtEZtRt+1 · · ·Rn ≤ γa+
n∑
t=1
s¯n−tMn−t0 M3.
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Define b :=
∑n
t=1(1− α)n−tMn−t0 M3. Then b ∈ R+ and, for V (a, z) := a+mV ,
Ea,zV (an, Zn)− V (a, z) ≤ −(1− γ)a+ b. (51)
Choose ρ ∈ (0, 1−γ), mV ≥ n/ρ and d ∈ R+ such that (1−γ−ρ)d ≥ b+ (1−γ)mV .
Notice that V (a, z) = a+mV > d for all (a, z) /∈ B. Hence, (51) implies that
Ea,zV (an, Zn)− V (a, z) ≤ −ρV (a, z)− (1− γ − ρ)V (a, z) + b+ (1− γ)mV
< −ρV (a, z)− (1− γ − ρ)d+ b+ (1− γ)mV ≤ −ρV (a, z) (52)
for all (a, z) /∈ B. Combining (51) and (52) yieldsEa,zV (an, Zn)−V (a, z) ≤ −ρV (a, z)+
b1{(a, z) ∈ B} for all (a, z) ∈ S. Since V is bounded on B, the stated claim holds. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Claim (1) can be proved by applying Theorem 19.1.3 (or a
combination of Proposition 5.4.5 and Theorem 15.0.1) of Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
The required conditions in those theorems have been established by Lemmas C.4,
C.6, C.8 and C.9 above. Regarding claim (2), Lemmas C.8 and C.9 imply that
Ea,zV (an, Zn)−V (a, z) ≤ −n+b1{(a, z) ∈ B} for all (a, z) ∈ S, where B := [0, d]×Z is
petite. Since in addition {(at, Zt)} is ψ-irreducible by Lemma C.4, Theorem 19.1.2 of
Meyn and Tweedie (2009) implies that {(at, Zt)} is a positive Harris chain. Claim (2)
then follows from Theorem 17.1.7 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
To verify claim (3), since we have shown that Φ := {(at, Zt)} is positive Harris
with stationary distribution ψ∗, based on Theorem 16.1.5 and Theorem 17.5.4 of
Meyn and Tweedie (2009), it suffices to show that Q is V -uniformly ergodic. Let
Φn be the n-skeleton of Φ (see page 62 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009)). Then Φn
is ψ-irreducible and aperiodic by Proposition 5.4.5 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
Theorem 16.0.1 of Meyn and Tweedie (2009) and Lemmas C.8–C.9 then imply that
Φn is V -uniformly ergodic, and, there exists N ∈ N such that |||QnN −1⊗ψ∗|||V < 1,
where ‖µ‖V := supg:|g|≤V |
∫
g dµ| for µ ∈P(S) and, for all t ∈ N,
|||Qt − 1⊗ ψ∗|||V := sup
(a,z)∈S
‖Qt((a, z), ·)− ψ∗‖V
V (a, z)
.
To show that Q is V -uniformly ergodic, by Theorem 16.0.1 of Meyn and Tweedie
(2009), it remains to verify: |||Qt− 1⊗ψ∗|||V <∞ for t ≤ nN . This obviously holds
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since, by the proof of Lemma C.9, there exist L0, L1 ∈ R such that, for all t ∈ N,
|||Qt − 1⊗ ψ∗|||V ≤ sup
(a,z)∈S
sup
‖f‖≤V
∫ |f(a′, z′)|Qt((a, z), d(a′, z′))
V (a, z)
+ L0
≤ sup
(a,z)∈S
∫
V (a′, z′)Qt((a, z), d(a′, z′))
V (a, z)
+ L0 ≤ L0 + L1 <∞.
Hence, Q is V -uniformly ergodic and claim (3) follows. The proof is now complete. 
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